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PER SE REASONABLE SUSPICION:  
POLICE AUTHORITY TO STOP THOSE  
WHO FLEE FROM ROAD CHECKPOINTS 
SHAN PATEL 
INTRODUCTION 
Picture this scenario: It is closing time for bars and all the 
customers are forced to leave. Rather than calling a taxi, an 
intoxicated patron decides to take his chances and drive home. He 
exits the parking lot and turns onto the road to his house. Suddenly 
he sees traffic cones and flashing blue lights ahead—a sobriety 
checkpoint. Panic hits the driver with full force as he contemplates 
what to do. Then he launches into a plan of action. The driver makes 
an abrupt, but legal, U-turn using a driveway and reverses direction 
to avoid the checkpoint. He knows another way home that does not 
require passing through the checkpoint. A police officer sees his 
evasive action and pursues him. Should the officer be able to stop the 
driver as he attempts to flee? Would it make a difference if the 
intoxicated driver was actually smuggling illegal aliens or a convicted 
felon? What if he was a terrorist with a bomb in his car? 
This scenario is not far-fetched; many drivers have sought to 
evade checkpoints.1 Courts, however, have disagreed over whether 
law enforcement officials may stop the fleeing vehicles. This Note 
investigates the legal issues surrounding the evasion of police 
checkpoints and argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a 
bright-line rule that allows police to stop vehicles that attempt to 
evade checkpoints.2 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Shan Patel. 
 1. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 2. Such a rule instructs states on how to read the Fourth Amendment. Of course, states 
are free to reach different conclusions (that better protect individual liberties) based on their 
own constitutions. 
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In arguing for a bright-line rule, this Note considers three factors. 
First, it looks at the effect that permitting individuals to avoid 
checkpoints has on the rights of individuals who continue through the 
checkpoint. In essence, this involves a discussion of the justifications 
behind allowing checkpoints in the first instance. Second, it evaluates 
the rights of the fleeing motorists—namely, whether there is 
reasonable suspicion to stop them. Finally, it briefly addresses the 
benefits of a bright-line rule, both in furthering the essential purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment and in serving as a practical tool for law 
enforcement. 
Part I introduces the legal background, including both the legal 
rationale for allowing checkpoints and whether reasonable suspicion 
applies in the flight context. Part II illustrates the differing 
conclusions courts have reached concerning whether vehicles can be 
stopped solely for evading a checkpoint. Part III argues in favor of 
per se reasonable suspicion for fleeing vehicles. The conclusion 
briefly discusses the policy benefits that this bright-line rule would 
create. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Reasonableness Standard 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The Supreme Court has 
stated that “[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth 
Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the 
exercise of discretion by government officials, including law 
enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .’”4 Courts evaluate the 
reasonableness of a specific police practice by comparing the act’s 
intrusion on the individual with the legitimate government interest it 
serves.5 Generally, the government’s interest is measured against an 
objective standard, such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has extended federal protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ( “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 4. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)) (internal citation omitted). 
 5. Id. at 654. 
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which sets the bar for when intrusion on the individual is permissible.6 
As a result, “[a] search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the 
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”7 Such suspicion, 
however, is not an irreducible requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment,8 and there are limited instances in which the general 
rule is not applied.9 Vehicular checkpoints, for example, are held to a 
different standard. 
1. Stopping a Vehicle Is a Seizure and Hence Must Be 
Reasonable.  The Court has held that “whenever a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to [move] away, he has 
‘seized’ that person.”10 By stopping a vehicle, an officer has effectively 
restrained the driver’s ability to move freely, and thus such a stop is a 
seizure.11 This is true even for limited stops in which an officer quickly 
checks a driver’s identification and then allows the driver to depart.12 
Thus, even a brief stop, whether carried out at a checkpoint or by a 
roving patrol car, constitutes a seizure and therefore must be 
reasonable to meet constitutional scrutiny.13 But checkpoint stops 
 
 6. Id. at 654–55. 
 7. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 8. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976). 
 9. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. For example, the Court has upheld “suspicionless searches” 
when the search furthers “‘special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement’” and 
when the search is limited and has a valid administrative purpose. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). The “special needs” rationale has been used to 
justify drug testing programs. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664–65 (holding a school’s policy of 
drug testing all student athletes to be reasonable and constitutional); Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (holding that a United States Customs Service 
policy of drug testing employees seeking certain positions was reasonable). Administrative 
searches often seek compliance with regulatory statutes. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 
691, 702 (1987) (upholding the search of a junkyard because it was a “closely regulated” 
business) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of 
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding a health code constitutional if “reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a 
particular dwelling”). 
 10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
 11. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653 (“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a ‘seizure’ . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention quite brief.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 653–54; see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556 (holding that checkpoint stops 
are seizures). 
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differ from roving patrol stops.14 A checkpoint seeks to stop all cars 
passing through a fixed point, but a roving stop is made at the 
discretion of a police officer who suspects that a specific car is 
violating a law. As a result, roving patrol stops are subject to a 
different reasonableness inquiry than checkpoint stops.15 
2. Reasonable Suspicion Required for Roving Patrol Stops.  The 
traditional roving patrol stop only passes constitutional muster if the 
officer had reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity [was] afoot.”16 
This standard stems from the landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. 
Ohio17 that upheld a police officer’s right to stop and frisk a suspect 
even if the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect.18 In 
Terry, an officer observed two men repeatedly peering in a store 
window, which aroused his suspicion that they were casing the store.19 
The officer approached the suspects, identified himself as a police 
officer, and requested their names.20 After the suspects mumbled a 
response, the officer patted down the exterior of their clothing and 
removed two illegally concealed weapons from their overcoats.21 The 
trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence, 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the officer 
obtained the evidence in violation of the defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.22 
The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment covers stopping 
and frisking suspects, even if they are not arrested, because they have 
 
 14. Roving patrol stops are the traditional stops in which police officers turn on their lights 
(or make other signals) to pull over a vehicle. This Note uses the terms “roving patrol stop” and 
“discretionary stop” interchangeably. 
 15. Compare infra text accompanying notes 29–32, with text accompanying notes 56–61. 
 16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may 
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he 
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the 
original stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, 
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault him.”). 
 17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 18. Id. at 20. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id. at 6–7. 
 21. Id. at 7. 
 22. Id. at 8. 
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been seized as soon as they are prevented from walking away.23 But 
the Court clarified that probable cause was not needed to justify a 
stop that was based upon a patrol officer’s contemporaneous 
observations.24 Rather, the reasonableness of the stop must be 
determined by balancing the government’s need for the seizure with 
the degree of its invasion.25 Police officers need to cite “specific and 
articulable facts” that make an intrusion reasonable,26 allowing for an 
objective determination of whether the facts would “warrant a man of 
reasonable caution” to believe that the action was justified.27 The 
Court stated that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity legitimizes 
an initial stop, and if during that stop the officer becomes reasonably 
suspicious that the suspect is armed and dangerous, a frisk of the 
suspect’s outer clothing is constitutional.28 
Given that traffic stops, like pedestrian stops, are seizures,29 they 
must be based upon probable cause or pass the objective 
reasonableness balancing test created in Camara v. Municipal Court30 
and applied in Terry.31 Thus, in the absence of probable cause, officers 
on roving patrol need specific articulable facts, or inferences from 
such facts, that create suspicion of criminal activity.32 In analyzing 
whether such suspicion existed, reviewing courts must look at all of 
the circumstances of a given case to determine whether an officer had 
a specific and objective basis for the discretionary stop.33 Although it 
 
 23. Id. at 16. 
 24. Id. at 20. 
 25. Id. at 20–21. 
 26. Id. at 21. 
 27. Id. at 21–22 (internal quotations omitted). 
 28. Id. at 30. The Court applied the standard to the case at hand and decided that both the 
initial stop and subsequent frisk were justified. Id. at 28. 
 29. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
 30. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967). 
 31. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. 
 32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); see also United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective 
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”). 
Warrantless searches need probable cause, which exists when the facts are such that a 
reasonable man would believe that a crime is in progress or that one has been committed. 
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). The reasonable suspicion standard is different 
in that it deals with the suspicion of criminal activity, whereas probable cause requires the belief 
that such activity is occurring. 
 33. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
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is an objective test, the expertise and training of the officer is relevant 
in evaluating reasonable suspicion.34 
Even when the government has a strong interest in suspicionless 
roving patrol stops, the Supreme Court has refused to waive the 
articulable suspicion requirement. In 1975, for example, the Court 
refused to allow discretionary stops aimed at combating illegal 
immigration in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.35 In that case, officers 
stopped a vehicle because the passengers appeared to be Mexican and 
the vehicle was traveling north near a closed Border Patrol 
checkpoint in Southern California.36 The Border Patrol based its 
argument for the stop’s justification on a statute that allowed the 
Border Patrol to make suspicionless stops of vehicles within one 
hundred miles of the border.37 In evaluating the constitutionality of 
the statute, the Court again employed a balancing test, weighing the 
interests of the government against the level of intrusion.38 Despite 
finding that the interest in curbing illegal immigration was great and 
the brief detention only created a modest intrusion, the Court held 
that the roving stop was still unreasonable.39 
The Court explained that smuggling activities, including human 
trafficking, generally give rise to specific grounds for identifying 
perpetrators, and hence, allowing officers to stop vehicles under a 
standard of reasonable suspicion would adequately protect the 
government’s interest.40 Second, the majority noted that there is a 
huge amount of legal traffic within one hundred miles of the two 
thousand-mile border.41 Suspicionless roving patrols allow officers to 
use broad discretion to stop whomever they please and thus violate 
the central tenet of the Fourth Amendment.42 In sum, although there 
is a legitimate government interest and minimal intrusion to the 
individual, suspicionless roving patrol stops are unreasonable due to 
issues with their effectiveness and the unfettered police discretion 
that they permit. Although the Court’s holding was fatal to 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 36. Id. at 875. 
 37. Id. at 877. 
 38. Id. at 878. 
 39. Id. at 879–80, 882. 
 40. Id. at 883; see also infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the reasonable suspicion standard). 
 41. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883. 
 42. Id. at 882; see also supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the essential 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment). 
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suspicionless roving patrol stops in the interior of the country, such 
detentions sufficiently close to the border appear to be valid.43 
Four years later, the Court once again ruled against suspicionless 
discretionary stops. In Delaware v. Prouse,44 a police officer, merely 
because he was not preoccupied, stopped a vehicle to check the 
driver’s license and registration.45 In evaluating the permissibility of 
the stop, the Court again employed the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness balancing test: balancing the state’s interest in 
upholding the stop with the level of intrusion suffered by the 
individual.46 The Court admitted that the government had a valid 
safety interest in ensuring that drivers and their vehicles had the 
requisite qualifications to be on the road.47 But it also explained that 
the intrusion of the temporary seizure on the individual was great, 
because the stop could be inconvenient, waste time, and cause severe 
anxiety for the driver.48 
To determine whether a legitimate government interest justified 
the intrusion, the Court looked at whether the discretionary stop was 
a “sufficiently productive mechanism” to further the government’s 
interests.49 In concluding that the stop was not productive, and thus 
unreasonable, the Court evaluated alternative mechanisms for 
enforcing vehicle safety regulations.50 It explained that the best way to 
enforce vehicle safety regulations is to pull over vehicles that violated 
traffic laws.51 There are countless legitimate vehicle stops every day at 
which officers routinely request the driver’s license and registration.52 
Without empirical data showing the effectiveness of suspicionless 
stops, the Court believed that stopping observed violators is a more 
effective approach because a violator is more likely than a random 
law-abiding driver to lack a valid license or registration.53 Thus, the 
marginal utility of the discretionary stops did not justify the intrusion 
 
 43. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The implication here is that 100 miles from the border 
is not sufficiently close to the border to warrant suspicionless roving stops. 
 44. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 45. Id. at 650. 
 46. Id. at 654. 
 47. Id. at 658. 
 48. Id. at 657. 
 49. Id. at 659. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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to the individual.54 Furthermore, such stops allow unfettered 
discretion by officers to act on hunches and are counter to the Fourth 
Amendment’s central aim—limiting the discretion of government 
officials to stop and search whomever they please.55 
3. Individualized Suspicion Not Needed for Fixed Road 
Checkpoints.  This Note has already mentioned that individualized 
suspicion is not an irreducible constitutional requirement of a 
legitimate stop.56 Fixed road checkpoints are an exception to the 
traditional rule, in part because individuals do not have the same 
expectation of privacy in vehicles as they do in their residences.57 
Moreover, a routine checkpoint does not usually involve a search.58 In 
general, courts evaluate fixed checkpoint stops by balancing the 
government’s interest in the stop with the level of intrusion imposed 
on the individual.59 This evaluation includes an inquiry into both the 
effectiveness of the practice (to see if it furthers the government’s 
interests) and the extent to which police discretion is limited (to judge 
the level of intrusion on the individual).60 In essence, if (1) the 
government has a permissible interest, (2) the checkpoint furthers 
that interest, and (3) the intrusion on the individual is slight, the 
checkpoint stop is valid even without individualized suspicion.61 
The modern debate over the constitutionality of road 
checkpoints began as a result of the fight against illegal immigration. 
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,62 the defendants challenged the 
constitutionality of permanent immigration checkpoints about sixty 
 
 54. Id. at 659, 661. 
 55. Id. at 661; see also supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text (discussing the essential 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment). 
 56. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 57. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). This on its own, however, is 
not enough to defeat the need for articulable suspicion, because discretionary stops of vehicles 
are not immune from that requirement. That said, there are differences between roving patrol 
and checkpoint stops that alter the factors in the balancing test and allow checkpoint stops to 
forgo individualized suspicion. (Fixed checkpoint stops, for example, stop everyone and thus 
lower the relative intrusion on the driver.) See infra Part III.B. 
 58. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561. 
 59. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. 
 60. See infra notes 61–97 and accompanying text (illustrating the balancing test in action). 
 61. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452, 455 (1990) (outlining the 
reasonableness test that governs road checkpoints). But cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (refusing to suspend the requirement of individualized suspicion when the 
checkpoint is used “for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes”). 
 62. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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miles north of the Mexican border.63 Applying its traditional 
balancing test, the Court’s initial findings were similar to its 
evaluation of the suspicionless roving patrol stops in Brignoni-
Ponce.64 The Martinez-Fuerte Court found that the government’s 
interest in limiting illegal immigration was great and that it had great 
difficulty policing the two thousand-mile U.S.-Mexican border.65 In 
terms of the Fourth Amendment rights of the vehicles’ occupants, the 
intrusion was limited, given that the stop was very brief—often 
consisting of only one or two questions.66 However, even with these 
findings, the Brignoni-Ponce Court had found the searches 
unreasonable, due to the effectiveness of the reasonable suspicion 
standard and the disdain for unfettered police discretion in roving 
patrols.67 The Martinez-Fuerte Court, in contrast, decided that 
permanent interior immigration checkpoints were reasonable due to 
their effectiveness (vis-à-vis a reasonable suspicion standard) and the 
limits they imposed on the discretion of government authorities.68 
Regarding the effectiveness of suspicionless checkpoints, the 
Court explained that they were vital tools for curbing illegal 
immigration: 
[Such a] program . . . is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens 
cannot be controlled effectively at the border . . . . These 
checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence 
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into 
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many 
smugglers and illegal aliens . . . . And the prospect of such inquiries 
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled, 
slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to 
detection by roving patrols . . . . A requirement that stops on major 
routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be 
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow 
the particularized study of a given car . . . [and] such a requirement 
would largely eliminate any deterrent to . . . smuggling 
operations . . . [on main] highways . . . .69 
 
 63. Id. at 545, 549, 550. 
 64. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 65. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. 
 66. Id. at 557–58. 
 67. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–83 (1975). 
 68. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557–59. 
 69. Id. at 556–57. 
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Next, the Court explained that checkpoints grant less discretion to 
law enforcement officers.70 Unlike suspicionless roving patrol stops, 
routine checkpoints do not greatly interfere with legitimate traffic, 
because motorists can always ascertain the location of fixed 
checkpoints.71 In addition, permissible checkpoints should treat all 
drivers objectively: 
The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are 
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, 
that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public 
interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers 
in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions 
as to the most effective [policy] . . . . [S]uch officials will be unlikely 
to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on 
motorists as a class.72 
Note that in evaluating whether a search adequately limited law 
enforcement discretion, the Court looked at whether drivers would 
likely be caught off guard by the stop or fear that it is illegitimate.73 
Sobriety checkpoints have also been deemed permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. In Michigan Department of State Police v. 
Sitz,74 state citizens challenged the constitutionality of Michigan’s 
sobriety checkpoint program.75 In upholding the program, the Court 
again employed the reasonableness balancing test by balancing the 
government’s interest in eliminating drunk driving against the 
intrusiveness of the stop, which it divided into objective and 
subjective intrusions.76 
Regarding the first prong of the balancing test, the Sitz majority 
found that the government has a clear interest in reducing the 
extensive damage and fatalities caused by drunk driving.77 To succeed, 
however, the checkpoint has to promote that public interest 
effectively.78 In evaluating effectiveness, the Court clarified that 
elected officials, as opposed to courts, should determine which police 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 559. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 558–59. 
 74. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 75. Id. at 447–48. 
 76. Id. at 452, 455. 
 77. Id. at 451. 
 78. Id. at 453–54. 
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techniques should be used to combat a public threat.79 The Michigan 
policy passed this effectiveness test because the legislative 
determination to set up the checkpoint was backed by empirical 
evidence showing that the proportion of arrests for drunk driving to 
total drivers passing through the checkpoint was between 1 and 1.5 
percent.80 
In terms of the second prong of the balancing test, the Court 
reiterated that the extremely brief nature of a checkpoint stop is a 
slight intrusion to the individual.81 Calling this the objective intrusion, 
the majority then proceeded to investigate the subjective intrusion, 
which dealt with the fear and surprise experienced by law-abiding 
drivers approaching the checkpoint.82 The Court described this 
subjective intrusion as minimal, noting that stopped motorists can see 
clear evidence both of the officials’ authority and that others have 
been stopped.83 In addition, a checkpoint’s location is determined by 
guidelines that limit the discretion of individual officers.84 
In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
third type of road checkpoint: information-seeking stops that solicit 
information regarding past crimes.85 Local police in Illinois set up a 
highway roadblock to distribute flyers about a hit-and-run that 
occurred a week earlier and to request public help in locating the 
culprit.86 A motorist who was arrested for driving while intoxicated, in 
part due to the presence of the checkpoint, challenged its 
constitutionality.87 The Court held that the checkpoint met each part 
of the reasonableness balancing test and thus was permissible.88 First, 
there was grave public concern as a result of the crime, and the police 
 
 79. Id. at 454. 
 80. Id. at 455. 
 81. Id. at 451. 
 82. Id. at 452. Splitting the intrusion component into “objective” and “subjective” 
components is akin to previous evaluations that first look at the actual intrusion created by a 
stop and then evaluate the level of discretion given to officers. If the discretion is too broad, the 
checkpoint is invalid in part because it can lead to arbitrary detentions and can scare and 
surprise unsuspecting motorists. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 
(1975) (providing that broad discretion given to officials invalidates even brief seizures). 
 83. Sitz, 496 U.S at 453. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422–23 (2004). 
 86. Id. at 422. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 427. 
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needed help in finding the perpetrator.89 In addition, the timing of the 
checkpoint effectively furthered the government’s interest; given that 
the roadblock was set up in the vicinity of the accident and at around 
the same time of day that the accident had occurred, it was reasonable 
to believe that motorists in the area might have relevant 
information.90 Second, the objective intrusion was minimal both 
because the stop was brief and because the subjective intrusion was 
equally limited given that the police stopped everyone and hence 
there was no cause for anxiety among those detained.91 
Vehicle document checkpoints are also likely constitutional, 
though the Court has not directly addressed such checkpoints. The 
Prouse Court stated that document checkpoints could be 
constitutional if they somehow limited the discretion of law 
enforcement officials.92 Specifically, the majority authorized the 
questioning of all vehicles at a checkpoint as an alternative.93 A 
document checkpoint of this type was implicitly upheld in a later case, 
when narcotics found in plain view during a driver’s license 
checkpoint were deemed admissible in court.94 In addition, the Prouse 
majority clarified that truck weigh stations and inspection checkpoints 
are legitimate even though they subject trucks to greater inspection 
than other vehicles.95 
Finally, in dicta, the Court has implicitly authorized the use of 
road checkpoints in various areas in which the government’s interest 
in the stop is very great. These include airports, government 
buildings, and military bases—places “where the need for such 
[searches] to ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”96 
Moreover, the “Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an 
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
 95. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n.26. 
 96. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000); see also United States v. Green, 
293 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he protection of the nation’s military installations from 
acts of domestic or international terrorism is a unique endeavor, . . . [and] vehicles pose a special 
risk” of delivering “car bombs.”). 
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terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee 
by way of a particular route.”97 
B. Evading Fixed Road Checkpoints and the Flight Doctrine 
1. Defining “Evasion” at Fixed Road Checkpoints.  It is difficult 
to ascertain what exactly constitutes evasion of a fixed checkpoint. 
After all, the act of evasion is heavily intertwined with the subjective 
intent of the actor, and, as a result, it is nearly impossible to prove 
conclusively that someone intended to avoid the police unless that 
person confesses. Still, police can rely on common sense and 
circumstantial evidence to determine when there is reasonable 
suspicion that a driver sought to evade a checkpoint.98 
Police have considered a broad range of driver activity to be 
indicative of evasive behavior. Clear-cut examples of evasive 
behavior include drivers who make U-turns or reverse direction at the 
sight of a checkpoint.99 For example, a vehicle that suddenly stops and 
backs away from a checkpoint is characteristic of evasion.100 Similarly, 
 
 97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. Although the Supreme Court has generally upheld road 
checkpoints as reasonable stops, it found a highway checkpoint unconstitutional when its 
primary goal was arresting motorists in possession of illicit narcotics. Id. at 34, 48. In Edmond, 
the Court distinguished a narcotics checkpoint from other permissible checkpoints because the 
drug checkpoint’s purpose was to advance “the general interest in crime control.” Id. at 44. 
Immigration and sobriety checkpoints, in contrast, have the more specific purposes of “policing 
the border” and “ensuring roadway safety,” respectively. Id. at 41. The Court explained that the 
immigration concerns specific to the border and “vehicle-bound threat” of drunk drivers 
justified roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. Id. at 43. Similarly, searches in airports and 
government buildings are legitimate due to the “acute” threat present in those locales. Id. at 47–
48. The government’s general interest in controlling crime, however, is not specific enough to 
warrant a suspension of individualized suspicion. Id. at 43–44. Allowing roadblocks for “general 
crime control” would give law enforcement officials the power to utilize suspicionless 
checkpoints for nearly any purpose, because there is always some “possibility that interrogation 
and inspection may reveal” evidence that an individual has committed a crime. Id. 
 98. In fact, police always rely on such observations when making articulable suspicion 
judgments. For example, they have the right to stop a criminal fleeing from a high-crime area 
without conclusive knowledge that the individual committed a crime. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text. 
 99. The cases cited immediately infra at notes 100–05 are for illustrative purposes only. 
That is, they provide examples of what police (at the local level) believed was evasive behavior. 
In many cases, the courts overturned those decisions, either finding the behavior not clearly 
evasive or finding an absence of reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle that avoided a 
checkpoint. The latter finding is the crux of the issue that drives this Note. For further 
discussion of how these cases were resolved, see infra Part II.B. 
 100. See State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Neb. 1997) (motorist stopped for putting 
his car in reverse and backing away from a checkpoint). 
06__PATEL.DOC 7/20/2007  1:43 PM 
1634 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1621 
a driver who uses a driveway or parking lot to make a U-turn also 
creates suspicion of evasive intent.101 In addition, police in Virginia 
stopped a driver who drove through the parking lot of a gas station at 
the corner of an intersection where a checkpoint had been set up, 
under the rationale that he was trying to avoid the fixed stop.102 Police 
at checkpoints have also stopped vehicles for less obvious evasive 
behavior. Drivers have been questioned when they pull into 
driveways or parking lots near checkpoints and simply park their 
cars.103 In fact, in certain states, vehicles that make legal turns onto 
other roads in sight of a checkpoint can be stopped under the 
suspicion that they purposely made the turns to avoid the police.104 Of 
course, police often use a combination of these evasive characteristics 
to conclude that a driver is attempting to avoid a checkpoint.105 
Given that identifying evasive behavior remains a subjective 
task, it is difficult to create an objective definition of what constitutes 
such behavior. Unsurprisingly then, courts have differed on what 
constitutes evading a checkpoint.106 Presumably, legal U-turns within 
sight of a checkpoint raise reasonable suspicion of evasive behavior. 
 
 101. See Coffman v. State, 759 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (vehicle stopped for 
pulling into and out of a driveway to make a U-turn); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 704 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (driver stopped for making a U-turn through a store’s parking lot); 
Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (vehicle stopped for 
making a U-turn through a semicircular driveway); see also infra notes 148–149 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. Bass v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921, 922 (Va. 2000). 
 103. See Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 149, 151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (vehicle detained for 
making a quick turn into a driveway); State v. D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 71 (Me. 1992) (vehicle 
detained for turning into a driveway that an officer did not believe was the driver’s); People v. 
Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1992) (vehicle stopped after it turned into a motel 
parking lot).  
 104. See State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000) (holding that a vehicle that 
makes a legal turn onto another road within sight of a checkpoint can be stopped by the police). 
It is interesting to note that in this case, an officer had actually been instructed to patrol 
secondary streets to ensure that vehicles did not try to make legal turns onto them. Id. at 922; 
see also Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (vehicle stopped 
for making a legal turn onto an unpaved road seventy-five to one hundred yards from a 
checkpoint). 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d 86, 86 (S.D. 1991) (police stopped a southbound 
motorist who made a U-turn prior to a checkpoint and then utilized side streets to continue 
back in a southern direction). Here, the driver did more than simply make a U-turn—in essence, 
he made two U-turns to circumvent the checkpoint. Id.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 269–70 (2002) (vehicle stopped due to a number of suspicious circumstances, one of 
which was the fact that it was on a road often used by smugglers to circumvent a fixed 
checkpoint). 
 106. See generally infra Part II.A. 
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Though many other behaviors may indicate attempted evasion, the 
debate over which behaviors raise reasonable suspicions remains 
outside the scope of this Note, given that much litigation revolves 
around U-turns. In short, this Note seeks to determine how police 
should respond to evasion regardless of its definition.107 
2. The Flight Doctrine and Reasonable Suspicion.  The inquiry 
at the heart of whether it is constitutionally permissible to stop a car 
that evades a road checkpoint is whether the driver’s actions create 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. These circumstances are 
analogous to an individual who flees at the mere sight of police. In 
such cases, courts have generally found that unprovoked flight can be 
one factor, but not the only one, in justifying a stop.108 
In Florida v. Royer,109 the Supreme Court stated that when an 
officer approaches an individual and seeks voluntary responses to 
questions, the individual is not obligated to answer those questions.110 
In fact, the person may ignore the questions and walk away.111 In a 
later case, the Court clarified that police need more than a mere 
 
 107. Because the issue of this Note is framed around otherwise “legal” evasive action upon 
approaching a checkpoint, it is vital to emphasize that such action exists. On one end of the 
spectrum is legal vehicular action that is so far removed from the checkpoint that it cannot 
realistically be called evasive. For example, an automobile that makes a legal turn onto another 
road a mile from a checkpoint hardly creates reasonable suspicion that it was evading the 
checkpoint. At the other end of the spectrum are blatantly illegal U-turns (for example, over a 
median) immediately in front of a checkpoint. Obviously, an illegal traffic maneuver to avoid a 
checkpoint is irrelevant for this analysis, because such vehicles can be stopped for having 
committed a traffic offense. See, e.g., ESPN.com News Services, Ex-Duke Star Redick Charged 
With Drunken Driving, June 14, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/draft2006/news/story?id= 
2482061 (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (discussing a college basketball star’s illegal U-turn prior to 
a sobriety checkpoint). Significant middle ground exists between these extremes (for example, 
legal U-turns), and those are the circumstances this Note seeks to address.  It is unlikely that 
police will render the issue moot by simply erecting roadblocks in areas where no legal U-turn 
or turn onto another road can be made. First, this would essentially limit checkpoints to 
highways and severely limit their effectiveness. They would be less random, and well-informed 
drivers could easily avoid them by simply traveling on local roads. Moreover, a number of 
routes, which are commonly used for drunk driving or smuggling, would be untouched by 
checkpoint deterrence because they are local roads. Second, the numerous court cases that deal 
with the legitimacy of stopping individuals who take legal actions to avoid checkpoints indicate 
that this is far from a dead issue. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Search and Seizure: “Furtive” Movement or Gesture 
As Justifying Police Search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581, 3–7 (2005) (referencing numerous authorities 
regarding the role of flight, among other furtive gestures, in creating reasonable suspicion). 
 109. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
 110. Id. at 497–98. 
 111. Id. 
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refusal to cooperate to justify detention.112 Nevertheless, there is a 
significant difference between refusing to answer an officer’s 
questions and immediately fleeing when an officer comes into view. 
Acknowledging this distinction, the Court specifically examined the 
question of whether flight can give rise to reasonable suspicion in 
Illinois v. Wardlow.113 
In Wardlow, police were patrolling a section of Chicago known 
for significant drug trafficking when the defendant, Wardlow, saw the 
officers and fled.114 The police pursued and stopped Wardlow, and 
during a protective pat-down they discovered a concealed handgun.115 
In determining that reasonable suspicion supported the stop, the 
Court distinguished these circumstances from Royer and its progeny: 
[U]nprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. 
Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, 
it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight 
to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with 
the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and 
remain silent in the face of police questioning.116 
The Court stated that nervous and evasive behavior can contribute to 
a finding of reasonable suspicion.117 In addition, it explained that 
“[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of 
evasion: [i]t is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is 
certainly suggestive of such.”118 
Reasonable suspicion was not justified in this case solely because 
of headlong flight.119 The location’s characteristics, specifically those 
that made it a high-crime area, were also taken into account.120 Thus, 
reasonable suspicion was justified in this case due to both Wardlow 
fleeing at the sight of police and the location being a high-crime 
area.121 The Court refused to establish a per se rule that fleeing the 
police, without more, automatically gives rise to articulable 
 
 112. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). 
 113. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). 
 114. Id. at 121–22. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 125. 
 117. Id. at 124. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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suspicion.122 But the Court also rejected the opposite per se rule—that 
a Terry stop can never be justified solely because a suspect fled at the 
sight of police.123 
By not providing a bright-line rule, the Court in Wardlow failed 
to clarify the exact importance of fleeing in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis and instead opted for a case-by-case analysis that evaluates 
all of the circumstances.124 The Court, however, made three important 
points regarding when fleeing gives rise to reasonable suspicion. First, 
it reiterated that evasive behavior such as fleeing from police is one 
factor to be considered in evaluating whether a stop is warranted.125 
Second, it held that articulable suspicion was created when an 
individual fled from police in a high-crime area.126 Third, it stated that 
the mere fact that an individual could have purely innocent reasons 
for appearing to flee police was not enough to negate reasonable 
suspicion.127 Regarding this third point, the Court stated that even in 
Terry the suspects who cased the store committed no unlawful act and 
could have had innocent explanations for their behavior.128 But that 
did not invalidate the stop: 
In allowing . . . detentions, Terry accepts the risk that officers may 
stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that 
risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested 
and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a 
crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more 
minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate 
further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of 
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.129 
Despite this holding, the specific circumstances in which flight from 
police will justify reasonable suspicion are unclear (with the exception 
of flight from a high-crime area). As a result, the circuit courts and 
state courts remain split on whether unprovoked flight alone warrants 
 
 122. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 126–27. 
 125. Id. at 124. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 126. 
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an investigatory stop.130 This difference of opinion has also manifested 
itself in Supreme Court opinions.131 
II.  OPINIONS DIFFER AS TO WHETHER AVOIDING A CHECKPOINT 
GIVES RISE TO A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Courts have differed over whether avoiding a checkpoint grants 
officers per se reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist. Although 
several state courts have failed to find per se suspicion, a few have 
stated otherwise. Part of this uncertainty stems from the Supreme 
Court’s silence on the issue. 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of 
whether attempting to evade a road checkpoint creates a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.132 The Court tangentially 
referenced the issue in United States v. Arvizu.133 In that case, a roving 
Border Patrol agent stopped a minivan north of the Mexican border 
because of its numerous suspicious characteristics, including its 
presence on a road that smugglers used to circumvent a fixed road 
checkpoint.134 In upholding the constitutionality of the stop, the Court 
 
 130. Compare United States v. Jackson, 741 F.2d 223, 224 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding a Terry 
stop constitutional when it was based on a suspect fleeing from police and yelling, “It’s the 
police, man, run”), and United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
flight from a lawful authority gives rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity), and Platt v. 
State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226–27 (Ind. 1992) (holding that flight at the sight of police is suspicious 
and authorizes an investigatory stop), and State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Wis. 1990) 
(holding that flight in a car at the sight of police was sufficient to warrant a Terry stop), with 
People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326–27 (Colo. 1989) (deciding that the act of running in the 
opposite direction of companions at the sight of police did not give the officers an articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity), and State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Neb. 1992) (holding that 
a seizure is not justified when the cause of stop is based solely on the defendant’s effort to elude 
the police), and State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 408 (N.J. 1994) (holding that the defendant’s 
flight at the sight of police was not enough to justify his seizure). 
 131. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., 
concurring) (“[T]he evidence should have been admitted, for respondent’s unprovoked flight 
gave the police ample cause to stop him . . . . [But to admit the evidence, t]he Court instead 
concentrates on the significance of the chase.”). 
 132. The Court upheld the conviction of a driver who was arrested after he drove through a 
checkpoint without stopping, but ignoring the request of law enforcement officials to stop raises 
different concerns than avoiding the officers altogether. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 448, 455 (1990); see also State v. Mitchell, 592 S.E.2d 543, 544, 546–47 (2004) 
(upholding the conviction of a driver who drove through a checkpoint without stopping). 
 133. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
 134. Id. at 269–70. 
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stated that, when evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts must look at 
all of the circumstances to ensure that the officer had a specific 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.135 In looking at the 
circumstances of the stop, location may prove determinative.136 For 
example, “failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer 
might well be unremarkable in one [place] (such as a busy San 
Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote 
portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”137 The Court cited the 
commonsense inference that the driver was avoiding the checkpoint 
as one of the circumstances that contributed to the reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity.138 Hence, although it did not address 
whether the inference that a driver was avoiding a checkpoint would 
independently give rise to reasonable suspicion, the Court found such 
furtive action deserving of consideration in a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.139 
B. State Split 
Although there is no disagreement that committing a traffic 
violation to elude a road checkpoint creates cause to stop the 
vehicle,140 there is significant disagreement among lower courts as to 
whether evading a checkpoint without breaking any traffic laws 
creates independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
A number of jurisdictions have held that avoiding or evading a 
checkpoint is per se suspicious and thus warrants a stop. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court, for example, explained that “the purpose of 
any checkpoint . . . would be defeated if drivers had the option to 
‘legally avoid,’ ignore or circumvent [a] checkpoint.”141 Thus, the 
court found reasonable suspicion when a vehicle made an abrupt turn 
 
 135. Id. at 273. 
 136. Id. at 275–76. 
 137. Id. at 276. 
 138. Id. at 277. 
 139. Id. The Court also reiterated the Wardlow conclusion that a “determination [of] 
reasonable suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Id. 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
stop was justified due to an illegal U-turn made by a motorist); United States v. Jones, 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding probable cause when a defendant violated traffic laws in 
attempting to back away from a checkpoint); see also Commonwealth v. Frombach, 617 A.2d 15, 
17, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding reasonable suspicion that a motorist was violating the 
Vehicle Code when the driver made an abrupt turn without signaling prior to reaching a 
checkpoint). 
 141. State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000). 
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after passing a sign advertising an approaching sobriety checkpoint.142 
The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that pulling into a driveway 
immediately before a checkpoint is an act of evasion that warrants an 
investigatory stop.143 An Alabama court justified a Terry stop under a 
similar rationale when a vehicle quickly turned into a driveway after 
coming into view of a roadblock.144 In addition, an Arkansas court 
upheld the stop of a vehicle that made a U-turn through a driveway as 
it approached a checkpoint, even though the arresting officers 
admitted that the stop was based only on the vehicle’s apparent 
attempt to avoid the checkpoint and not any criminal activity.145 
The majority of courts, however, have refused to adopt a bright-
line rule that avoiding a checkpoint automatically gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In these jurisdictions, 
avoidance is simply viewed as one factor in determining the existence 
of reasonable suspicion. 
Some courts employing this approach have concluded that stops 
of motorists who avoid checkpoints are justified as long as other 
factors contribute to the “totality” of the suspicion.146 For example, a 
Kentucky court found reasonable suspicion based on a vehicle’s 
evasive turn onto an unpaved road, the investigating officer’s prior 
experience, and the time of day.147 The Court of Appeals of Virginia 
came to a similar conclusion when a vehicle briefly paused as it 
approached a checkpoint and then turned into a driveway in an 
attempt to make a U-turn.148 In addition, some jurisdictions have 
justified stops of vehicles that make U-turns prior to checkpoints, as 
long as the training and experience of the specific officers involved 
 
 142. Id. at 922–24. 
 143. Boches v. State, 506 So. 2d 254, 256, 264 (Miss. 1987); see also Boyd v. State, 751 So. 2d 
1050, 1051–52 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (finding reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle that had 
made a legal turn to avoid a roadblock). 
 144. Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 149, 151–52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). 
 145. Coffman v. State, 759 S.W.2d 573, 574–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988). 
 146. Generally, these courts have implicitly, not explicitly, rejected the premise that 
avoidance alone causes reasonable suspicion. See infra notes 147–149, 151 and accompanying 
text. 
 147. Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 912, 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). 
 148. Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. 
D’Angelo, 605 A.2d 68, 71 (Me. 1992) (finding reasonable suspicion when suspects pulled into 
driveway seventy-five yards before a checkpoint and the officer had “reason to believe that the 
vehicle did not belong there”); People v. Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626–27 (App. Div. 1992) 
(finding reasonable suspicion when a car stopped short of checkpoint, pulled into a motel 
parking lot, and drove around without parking). 
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convince them that the U-turns are suspicious.149 Drawing an 
interesting parallel to Wardlow,150 a Pennsylvania appellate court used 
this logic to justify the stop of a vehicle that sought to avoid a 
checkpoint in a “‘well-known’ drug trafficking area.”151 
A number of jurisdictions have explicitly concluded that a legal 
traffic maneuver that results in a motorist avoiding a checkpoint does 
not, on its own, constitute reasonable suspicion.152 The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court stated that “there is no requirement that a driver go 
through a roadblock[, and thus f]ailing to go through the roadblock in 
and of itself . . . provides no basis for police intervention.”153 In 
explaining its rationale for a similar conclusion, the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained that the act of avoiding a checkpoint “merely 
demonstrates a desire to avoid police confrontation . . . and at best 
only gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may be afoot.”154 
Along these lines, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that 
circumventing a checkpoint by legally driving through the parking lot 
of a gas station did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because 
stopping such a vehicle would only be based on a hunch.155 Similarly, 
an Ohio court found that legal turns made by vehicles approaching 
checkpoints do not suffice to create the individualized suspicion 
necessary for a stop.156 Some states, such as Pennsylvania, Maine, 
Delaware, Utah, and Oregon have held that legal U-turns made prior 
to checkpoints also do not give rise to the level of suspicion needed 
 
 149. Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961, 963, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Stroud v. 
Commonwealth, 370 S.E.2d 721, 722–23 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); see also State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d 
86, 86, 88 (S.D. 1991) (finding reasonable suspicion when a southbound motorist made a U-turn 
prior to a checkpoint and then utilized side streets to continue back in a southern direction). 
 150. See supra note 113–123 and accompanying text. 
 151. Commonwealth v. Metz, 602 A.2d 1328, 1335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Although the Metz 
court explicitly refused to adopt a per se rule, id., its justification (and justifications based solely 
on the “training and experience” of officers) amounts to a per se rule, because all officers will 
likely claim that their training or experience caused them to be suspicious of a vehicle evading a 
checkpoint. In fact, on an intuitive level, most adults likely could cite their “life experience” in 
concluding that people who avoid checkpoints have a potentially unlawful reasons for doing so. 
 152. See infra notes 153–159 and accompanying text. 
 153. Commonwealth v. Scavello, 734 A.2d 386, 388 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). 
 154. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
 155. Bass v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921, 922–23, 925 (Va. 2000); see also Jorgensen v. 
State, 428 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an officer’s “intuition” that a driver 
was avoiding a checkpoint by pulling into an apartment complex in which he did not live did not 
justify the stop); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 704, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (holding no 
grounds existed to stop a motorist who made a U-turn through the parking lot of a store). 
 156. State v. Bryson, 755 N.E.2d 964, 968–69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
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for an investigatory stop.157 The Nebraska Supreme Court went one 
step further by invalidating the Terry stop of a motorist who, upon 
seeing a sobriety checkpoint, put her car in reverse and backed into a 
closed grocery store’s parking lot.158 The court explained that because 
she was not cited for any traffic violations, the driver had been pulled 
over solely due to her avoidance of the checkpoint, and thus the 
officers lacked adequate suspicion to justify the seizure.159 Finally, the 
Florida Highway Patrol has put out a police manual that explicitly 
instructs officers that a driver’s effort to avoid a checkpoint is not 
enough to warrant a stop absent other suspicious circumstances.160 
III.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CREATING A BRIGHT-LINE RULE THAT 
REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTS WHEN MOTORISTS EVADE ROAD 
CHECKPOINTS 
A bright-line rule that a vehicle that flees from a roadblock 
necessarily arouses reasonable suspicion would be constitutional and 
preferable to vaguer standards for three independent reasons. First, 
allowing drivers to legally turn around at checkpoints undermines the 
constitutional justification behind the checkpoints. Second, road 
checkpoint evasions involve flight from police under circumstances 
that should suffice to create reasonable suspicion under existing flight 
doctrine. Finally, a bright-line rule will help limit police discretion and 
thus further the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 157. See Howard v. Voshell, 621 A.2d 804, 807 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (no reasonable 
suspicion when a U-turn was made legally before a checkpoint); State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306, 
1307, 1308 (Me. 1991) (unreasonable for officer to believe that a U-turn made outside the 
perimeter of a checkpoint was made to avoid the checkpoint); Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Div. 
746 P.2d 716, 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stop after a legal U-turn invalid); Scavello, 734 A.2d at 
387–88 (legal U-turn executed to avoid a checkpoint does not create reasonable suspicion); 
Talbot, 792 P.2d at 495 (invalid stop of a vehicle that made a U-turn one-quarter of a mile 
before a checkpoint). 
 158. State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1997). 
 159. Id. at 793. 
 160. FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, COMPREHENSIVE ROADSIDE SAFETY CHECKPOINTS, at 
4 (Sept. 1, 1996), available at http://www.fhp.state.fl.us/html/Manuals/fh17-08.pdf; see also THE 
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, THE USE OF SOBRIETY 
CHECKPOINTS FOR IMPAIRED DRIVING ENFORCEMENT, at A-3 (Nov. 1990), available at 
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/5000/5900/5919/checkpt.pdf (stating a driver’s intent to avoid a checkpoint 
does not justify an officer stopping that driver). 
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A. Allowing Motorists to Evade Checkpoints Undermines the 
Justifications Behind Checkpoints 
Checkpoints are justified by employing a reasonableness 
balancing test that measures the government’s interest in the seizures 
against the level of intrusion on the individual.161 In evaluating these 
factors, courts look specifically at whether the checkpoint furthers the 
government’s interest and whether the intrusion is limited with regard 
to the level of discretion employed by individual officers.162 Allowing 
individuals to evade checkpoints both undermines the effectiveness of 
the checkpoints and increases the discretion of law enforcement 
officials. The following “effectiveness” and “discretionary” 
discussions relate to the constitutionality of the actual checkpoint, as 
opposed to the permissibility of stopping the fleeing vehicles. Thus, 
the evaluation focuses on the interests of the motorists who actually 
go through the checkpoint, to whom the reasonableness standard 
applies. 
1. Ensuring Effectiveness.  The Supreme Court has upheld 
border and sobriety checkpoints, among others, partially because it 
believed they were effective at protecting against illegal immigration 
and drunk drivers.163 Conversely, the Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse 
majorities invalidated suspicionless roving stops because there was no 
evidence that they were any more effective than the existing law 
enforcement mechanisms.164 As a result, suspicionless checkpoints are 
only justified if they are effective in achieving the government’s 
legitimate goals. 
To reiterate the words of North Carolina’s highest court, “the 
purpose of any checkpoint . . . would be defeated if drivers had the 
option to ‘legally avoid,’ ignore or circumvent [a] checkpoint.”165 
Intuitively, the individuals who are most likely to avoid a checkpoint 
are the ones with something to hide. Imagine that all drivers have a 
legal right to avoid a checkpoint and everyone realizes it. What type 
of driver would most likely take advantage of this option? 
Presumably, the answer is drivers who have something to hide. At the 
 
 161. See supra Part I.A. 
 162. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 163. See supra Part I.A. 
 164. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975). 
 165. State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000). 
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sight of a checkpoint, the most rational decision for intoxicated 
drivers, smugglers, and terrorists would be to turn around and flee. 
As a result, the checkpoints would only process law-abiding citizens, 
and the 0.12 to 1.5 percent of individuals screened at checkpoints who 
are usually arrested would fall to zero.166 
This hypothetical illuminates two main problems with a system 
that allows individuals to evade checkpoints. First, by not pursuing 
motorists who have exhibited suspicious behavior, law enforcement 
officers allow potentially dangerous individuals to continue roaming 
the nation’s roads. In fact, the decreased deterrent effect of the 
toothless checkpoints could increase the number of drunk drivers on 
the roads. Perhaps worse, police may give up opportunities to catch 
smugglers, terrorists, or other dangerous felons, who pose great risks 
to the public at large. Second, the essential justification for the 
checkpoint would no longer exist, because the checkpoint would no 
longer serve any legitimate government interest, given that no one 
would be caught. Thus, even the brief stop would become an 
unreasonable seizure. 
The most obvious flaw in this hypothetical is that many motorists 
will not be aware of their right to turn around at the sight of a 
checkpoint, and others may take a risk and attempt to fool 
investigators.167 This argument, however, illustrates another problem 
with letting knowledgeable citizens evade checkpoints: such a system 
punishes ignorant and foolhardy criminals, yet allows more intelligent 
perpetrators to drive away. Morally, this seems to be a dubious 
standard on which to justify checkpoint searches.168 Practically, if the 
Supreme Court announced that all drivers could make legal U-turns 
within sight of a checkpoint without ramifications, the word would 
 
 166. Mich. Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). The Sitz Court compared the 
typical 1 percent arrest rate at sobriety checkpoints (and 1.5 percent rate in that case) with 
constitutionally accepted immigration checkpoints that had “success” rates of 0.12 percent of 
vehicles (involving 0.5 percent of the total number of individuals passing through the 
checkpoints). Id. 
 167. Another potential flaw is that police could potentially erect roadblocks in a way that 
eliminates the possibility of legal U-turns. For a response to this critique, see the discussion 
supra note 107. 
 168. In contrast, it should be noted that consent-based searches have been upheld regardless 
of whether the individuals knew that they had the right to refuse the search. See Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding that the knowledge of the right to refuse a search 
is not a prerequisite to a valid consent-based search). But see id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing a policy that encourages law enforcement to capitalize on the ignorance of suspects). 
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spread fast—especially among the drunk drivers, smugglers, and 
terrorists who would be most affected by the policy. 
2. Limiting Discretion of Individual Law Enforcement Officers.  
The second prong of the reasonableness test evaluates the degree to 
which the checkpoint stop is an intrusion to the motorist. The 
objective intrusion is small because the stop is brief. The subjective 
intrusion, however, varies depending on the nature of the checkpoint. 
The intrusion can be reduced by minimizing the checkpoint’s 
psychological impact on the driver and minimizing the surprise and 
fear that the stop causes. Permissible checkpoints sufficiently limit 
police discretion by employing rigid guidelines and bright-line rules. 
These limitations on discretion help reassure motorists that everyone 
is being stopped and that they are not being singled out. This 
minimizes surprise and fear, thereby limiting the subjective intrusion 
of these stops.169 
Allowing individuals to evade a roadblock raises legitimate 
concerns regarding the subjective intrusion to those who enter the 
checkpoint. The search might appear extremely discretionary to 
confused motorists, as officials search individuals who pass through, 
while letting others take evasive action and go free. Utilizing the 
evasive action as a nondeterminative characteristic of reasonable 
suspicion increases the potential confusion of unaware motorists. In 
other words, because officers will consider evasive behavior as only 
one factor in determining the validity of a Terry stop, officers will 
stop some fleeing vehicles while allowing others to leave.170 Once 
again, the reasons for this distinction will be unclear to many 
motorists, and it may appear that the police are exercising unfettered 
discretion.171 
Subjective intrusions to individuals traveling through checkpoints 
have more to do with perceived law enforcement discretion than the 
realities of police practices. Individuals who are confused as to why 
they are being stopped while others are free to leave may be 
genuinely surprised and scared by the checkpoint. In reality, this 
confusion will rarely occur because few drivers stopped at 
checkpoints will know what happens to those who flee. Still, a bright-
 
 169. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 170. See supra Part II.B. 
 171. This would be particularly confusing for motorists who follow another vehicle that 
makes a U-turn and then wonder why they were pulled over and the other vehicle was not. 
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line rule that guarantees that evasive vehicles will be stopped would 
ensure the appearance of equal treatment of all motorists, thereby 
minimizing the subjective intrusion on those who go through 
checkpoints. 
3. Addressing the Objection from Libertarians and Civil Rights 
Advocates. Libertarians and civil rights advocates are likely to be 
outraged by proposals that give government authorities more power 
to intrude into the private lives of Americans.172 Their objections, 
however, are better suited for opposing the fixed checkpoint in 
general. Although this Note does not claim that  checkpoints that stop 
hundreds of drivers who have shown no suspicion of any wrongdoing 
are desirable, it does seem likely that libertarians would oppose these 
checkpoints. If such checkpoints are legitimate, however, it is 
important to ensure that they are effective. Otherwise, the initial stop 
at the checkpoint would be even more of an intrusion on the 
individual, because it would serve little governmental purpose to 
detain innocent drivers. Allowing officers to stop those fleeing 
checkpoints ensures that those checkpoints do their job. In addition, 
stopping all those who evade a checkpoint limits officers’ discretion 
and guarantees that police treat everyone equally and do not 
needlessly stop citizens.173 Hence, libertarians and civil rights 
advocates should support this measure as it both increases the 
effectiveness of the initial checkpoint and eliminates the unfettered 
discretion of police officers.174 
 
 172. Libertarians generally support a society with as little government interference as 
possible. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About the Libertarian Party, 
http://www.lp.org/article_85.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (listing information from the 
Libertarian National Committee). Civil rights advocates generally favor protections against 
government intrusions into citizens’ private affairs. See, e.g., ACLU, About Us, 
http://www.aclu.com/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (outlining the mission of a 
prominent civil rights interest group). Libertarian and civil rights activists have yet to form a 
public opinion on per se stops of motorists fleeing checkpoints. Hence, the libertarian and civil 
rights “objection” is this Note’s own interpretation of how typical libertarian and civil rights 
advocates might respond to its proposal. 
 173. To clarify, as long as the checkpoint is effective in catching some criminals, law 
enforcement does not needlessly stop citizens, even if innocent drivers are stopped. Libertarians 
and civil rights advocates may oppose checkpoints in the first place and thus oppose this entire 
system. The point is, however, that once it is accepted that fixed road checkpoints are 
legitimate, it is in their interest to embrace per se reasonable suspicion for those who flee. 
 174. Whether libertarians and civil rights advocates will support per se stops of fleeing 
vehicles is another matter; this argument merely concludes that they should support them on a 
theoretical level. 
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B. The Flight Doctrine and Evading Checkpoints 
Whereas the previous discussion evaluated the effect of allowing 
some motorists to flee on the rights of those who continue through 
the checkpoint,175 this Section examines the issue with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment rights of those who flee. The two issues involve 
different standards because the justification for stopping individuals 
who evade checkpoints is reasonable suspicion, whereas no such 
suspicion is needed at fixed checkpoint stops. 
As a threshold matter, evading a checkpoint by making a U-turn 
or turning off the road is a type of flight from lawful authority. 
Admittedly, one can argue that evasive drivers are just exercising 
their Royer right to refuse to answer an officer’s questions.176 But the 
Wardlow Court explained that evading police is different from mere 
refusal to cooperate: “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going about 
one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”177 This holds true for 
individuals who decide to turn around at the sight of a checkpoint. 
Going about their business would entail continuing through the 
roadblock. After all, they must have had some interest in the route 
because they freely chose it. Moreover, unlike pedestrians, drivers 
may have to take severe detours when attempting to circumvent 
roadblocks, because their routes are limited to the roads available to 
them.178 Thus, stopping individuals who flee from checkpoints is not 
stopping individuals who are merely trying to go about their 
business—the checkpoint has already interfered with their “business.” 
In addition, it is important to remember that stopping fleeing 
individuals does not change their Royer right to remain silent in the 
face of questioning.179 
The Arvizu Court explained that in evaluating indicia for 
reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts must look at the totality of the 
circumstances.180 One of these circumstances is driver action that 
raises an inference that the driver is trying to avoid a checkpoint.181 
 
 175. See supra Part III.A. 
 176. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). 
 177. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
 178. Pedestrians, conversely, have few limitations on where they can walk. 
 179. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. 
 180. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
 181. See id. (finding such an inference appropriate when a minivan was driving on a dirt 
road often used by drug smugglers, and the driver refused to acknowledge the police officer, 
slowed down at his approach, and appeared to instruct his children to wave). 
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The Wardlow Court added that “flight . . . is the consummate act of 
evasion: [i]t is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is 
certainly suggestive of such.”182 Even state courts arguing against a 
bright-line rule agree that apparent evasive conduct by a driver 
approaching a checkpoint should be considered when determining if 
there are grounds for a Terry stop.183 Thus, there is little debate that 
evasion gives rise to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 
The question is whether evading a checkpoint is sufficient on its 
own to pass a reasonable suspicion analysis. In looking at the totality 
of the circumstances, location may prove determinative, as ignoring a 
police officer may be routine in one setting but extremely out of the 
ordinary in another.184 As a result, fleeing from a high-crime area is 
enough on its own to constitute reasonable suspicion, as the flight in 
conjunction with the location gives rise to individualized suspicion.185 
Evading a checkpoint is no different. Unlike unprovoked flight at the 
mere sight of the police, individuals know that they will actually be 
stopped at a checkpoint. This emphasizes the inference that they have 
something to hide if they flee. Just as the existence of a high-crime 
area contributes to reasonable suspicion analysis in flight cases, the 
presence of a checkpoint is an important factor in the current 
scenario. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the evasive 
action taken within sight of a checkpoint creates reasonable suspicion, 
allowing officers to make a Terry stop.186 
1. Addressing the Counterarguments.  The strongest 
counterargument against stopping individuals who avoid checkpoints 
is that they may have innocent reasons for taking evasive action. For 
example, perhaps the driver is in a rush, thinks there is an accident 
ahead, or merely forgot something at home. But the fact that an 
individual could have purely innocent reasons for evasive action has 
no bearing on reasonable suspicion.187 As long as an officer has 
 
 182. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 183. See supra notes 153–159. 
 184. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276. 
 185. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119. 
 186. It should be emphasized that flight often gives rise to reasonable suspicion. In fact, the 
lower courts are split on whether unprovoked flight, on its own, is enough to constitute 
reasonable suspicion (and two Supreme Court justices feel that it is). See supra note 131 and 
accompanying text. Thus, it is far from a stretch to state that flight from a checkpoint should tip 
the balance in favor of reasonable suspicion. 
 187. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. 
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articulable facts that lead to logical inferences of criminal activity, the 
stop is justified.188 A Terry stop need not result in confirmed criminal 
activity, because such a stop “accepts the risk that officers may stop 
innocent people.”189 In fact, the Fourth Amendment allows this risk in 
the context of more extreme seizures, such as arrests and detentions 
based on probable cause.190 The risk of momentarily detaining 
innocent drivers is especially permissible, given that individuals have 
reduced expectations of privacy in their automobiles.191 Here, it is 
important to emphasize that a Terry stop is a minimal intrusion, and if 
an officer fails to find probable cause of criminal activity, the detained 
person is quickly freed.192 Thus, even though there are innocent 
reasons for avoiding a checkpoint, the minimal intrusion of stopping a 
fleeing vehicle is justified by the articulable suspicion that evasive 
behavior creates. 
Libertarians may also posit that per se reasonable suspicion 
impermissibly prevents a driver from taking any action that looks 
evasive. For example, if within visual proximity of a checkpoint a 
driver suddenly remembers leaving the stove on at home, the driver 
will not be able to make a U-turn to return home. Such a critique, 
however, is misguided. First, drivers consent to abide by state and 
federal laws when they are on the road, and hence their vehicular 
action is always limited. As a result, the driver responding to the small 
crisis of the stove is already limited. The driver cannot speed home, 
cannot make an illegal left turn even if it would make the trip quicker, 
and must abide by numerous other traffic laws. Going through a 
checkpoint or being stopped for evading that checkpoint is simply 
akin to any other traffic regulation.193 Second, and more to the point, 
this Note does not propose that a driver cannot make a U-turn in 
visual proximity of a roadblock. Such action is not illegal, and drivers 
will not be arrested for legally evasive actions. They can legally decide 
to avoid the checkpoint, and the only consequence will be a brief, 
nonthreatening investigatory stop. Once the officer determines that 
there is no further suspicion of criminal wrongdoing that would justify 
 
 188. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). 
 189. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126. 
 190. Id. 
 191. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). 
 192. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119. 
 193. This relates to the issue of consent. When citizens engage in the privilege of driving on 
government roads, they consent to the rules set forth by that government. 
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a longer detention, the driver is free to go.194 Evasive action on its own 
is not punished. 
2. Bright-Line Rules Decrease Police Discretion and Meet the 
Essential Purpose of the Fourth Amendment.  Finally, it is worth 
noting that bright-line rules of criminal procedure help uphold the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment and have the practical benefit of 
informing officers of exactly what they can and cannot do. 
The Court has noted that “[t]he essential purpose of the 
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government 
officials, including law enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .’”195 
Bright-line rules ensure that the government treats all citizens 
equally. Complicated subjective judgments by officers, although 
necessary in some cases, should be avoided when possible. In the 
context of road checkpoint evasion, forcing officers to evaluate the 
evasive nature in conjunction with other suspicious characteristics 
gives officers significant leeway to make discretionary decisions 
concerning whom they stop. In reality, officers can justify stopping 
vehicles by simply explaining that, based on their experiences and 
training, the evasion was suspicious. As a result, officers can pick and 
choose which vehicles they stop and justify their actions based on 
hard-to-review subjective criteria. 
In addition, a bright-line rule has significant practical value. 
Rather than having to engage in a complicated reasonable suspicion 
analysis or to pore over countless court decisions, officers will know 
they automatically have cause to stop evasive vehicles.196 As it has 
done in other cases, a Supreme Court ruling instituting a bright-line 
 
 194. Again it is important to emphasize the limited and brief nature of a Terry stop. See 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (describing an investigatory stop as a minimal intrusion in which if an 
officer finds no evidence of wrongdoing, the officer must let the individual go). 
 195. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 312 (1978)) (citations omitted). 
 196. Admittedly, debate could still exist as to what constitutes evasion. Although this Note 
addresses the issue in Part I.B., the Note’s main focus is addressing the threshold question as to 
whether evasion (regardless of its definition) creates reasonable suspicion. 
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standard would give officers in the field clear guidance about what 
actions they may take.197 
CONCLUSION 
Although this Note addresses the legal justifications for stopping 
vehicles that evade checkpoints, the policy justifications are also 
compelling. Simply put, the public has an interest in helping the 
police catch criminals, especially those who are dangerous threats to 
the public at large. Drunk drivers and fleeing felons, for example, 
clearly pose a risk to those around them due to their propensities to 
get into accidents and commit crimes. But the issue really crystallizes 
in the context of potential terrorism, in which the victims could be 
numerous. Especially in a global society in which suicide-attacks are 
becoming more frequent, law enforcement officials must have the 
tools to follow up on suspicious activity. Allowing terrorists with 
bombs to escape easily by making U-turns at checkpoints also gives 
them the opportunity to launch new attacks. As such, granting law 
enforcement officials per se reasonable suspicion to stop those who 
flee checkpoints would give officials a useful tool in the battle against 
terrorism, drunk driving, and other crimes. 
 
 197. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (specifically limiting a protective frisk to a 
suspect’s outer clothing); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (explicitly instructing 
police as to what rights must be read to suspects). 
